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by the Finance Minister in charge of Belgium's gold reserves abroad.13 And at length the remainder of the Belgian government in exile made over its prerogatives to Pierlot and Spaak,'4 who stole across Spain, then sailed to London late in October 1940 to set up there with their two colleagues for the duration.15
The King meanwhile ostensibly continued to abstain from any and every political act -with, however, a few exceptions, the most blatant of which was a trip to Berchtesgaden in November 1940,16 15. Later a few others made it to London -where they were none too readily reintegrated by Pierlot and Spaak. 16. This trip was itself a political act even if, as Leopold later claimed, he went only to solicit an amelioration of Belgium's food ration and the release of Belgian prisoners of war. On the moot question whether he also talked politics once there or only Hitler did, Contribution, 238-239, 608; Annales parlementaires de Belgique. Chambre des Reprisentants [hereafter referred to as Annales, Chambre]. Session ordinaire de 1944 -1945 Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bflhne 1923 -45 (Bonn, 1949 , 507-511. 17. With sporting Liliane Baels, a resident of Laeken at least since early 1940. The King declared the alliance nondynastic (Contribution, 273) -an act of uncertain validity. 18. Contribution, 309-311 (21 November 1943) .
19. By a note of 11 January 1944 (Contribution, 319; Rapport, 131 and Annexe 108) radioed to London on 21 January 1944 (Pierlot, 95) . 20. Dated 25 January 1944. 21. Contribution, 319. In a radio speech of 28 May 1940 Pierlot had accused the King of negotiating with the enemy, and at Limoges Spaak had charged the King with treachery on this account. They were mistaken -but the King's indignation was hardly in order given his original intention to negotiate, which had misled them. He called them until they were removed to a guarded villa outside Salzburg toward the end of the war.24
The Belgian chambers, reassembling jointly in September 1944, approved the Pierlot ministry's conduct since the invasion, then instituted a regency pending the King's return.25 When the King was liberated in Austria at the close of the war, the Belgian government of the day -headed by a Socialist, with Spaak as Foreign Minister -urged him to abdicate;26 then it refused to insure public order when, after weeks of wavering, he asked to return instead.27 So he moved to Switzerland provisionally,28 while a virulent campaign for his abdication was waged in parliament and the press. The technical charge against him was that he had repeatedly violated the constitution after the German invasion, primarily in late May 1940, when he had refused to retreat abroad with his ministers to pursue the war but instead had solicited an armistice, then delivered himself up to the enemy. The nontechnical grievance against him was that he had persisted in his neutralist attitude despite the invasion and occupation -an attitude distorted by Spaak into one of accommodation to an expected German victory.29 As Leopold's chief prosecutor, Spaak was evidently working off a bad conscience over his own defeatism of the summer of 194030 -and over his prewar compliance with Leopold's policy of neutrality, for in London he had made himself over into an apostle of Europeanism. The abdicationists might well have granted Leopold extenuating circumstances for his unconstitutional insistence at Wynendael on sharing the fate of his army and nation, especially since it had followed from his captivity to task for amputations against the Belgian army as well; in this he in turn was mistaken. de 1944-1945, 532 ; on the second occasion, ibid. ("every evening he inclined toward abdication, every morning he had changed his mind") and ibid., 586 ("it is certain that under our law the present wife of the King is the Queen of the Belgians"). 29. Annales, Chambre. Session ordinaire de 1944 -1945 30. At least Pierlot, 88, acknowledged that the government's suit for an armistice was a "grave error" and a "lapse" ("flechissement").
that Belgium concluded no armistice with Germany after all and that, until after his deportation, Belgium was ruled by a military commander rather than by a Gauleiter.31 Leopold's defenders, however, pleaded, not extenuating circumstances, but innocence: a commission of eminent legalists appointed by him even found that his ministers were to blame for having abandoned him at Wynendael!32
After five whole years of fearful polemics, a popular consultation was held: about 58% of the voters -the Flemish community by and large -declared for Leopold. General elections ensued: they yielded a Catholic majority, which voted Leopold's return -amidst angry cries inside and outside parliament against the "King of a party" and "King of the Flemings." Leopold's homecoming was answered by mass protest meetings; Spaak led a howling demonstration before the town palace; strikes paralyzed Wallonia and much of Germans would advance, not toward Paris, but toward the Pas de Calais:
"They'll be there within a week," he told Pierlot.36 In that case, Pierlot remarked, the King would of course rapidly maneuver his army southwards into France lest it be cut off. "No, not southwards," Leopold objected; "northwards!"37 Pierlot thought he had misheard: how then, he asked, could cooperation continue among the Allies? The Allies were not Belgium's allies, Leopold retorted, but merely the guarantors of Belgian neutrality. "Belgium was defending her independence," he insisted; "she was not bound to her guarantors' war aims."38
The next day at army headquarters Pierlot, Denis, and now also Spaak together told the King, according to Leopold, "that everything possible must be done to prevent the army's being blocked on home territory and isolated from the Allied forces."39 Leopold demurred. If he led his army abroad, he maintained, he would come under foreign laws and orders "with no relation to Belgium's interest."40 As the ministers protested, he switched his tack and argued that he could not just retreat this way or that without orders from the Allied high command.41 Then demand the requisite orders, he was told, and proceed even without them "if need be."42 1944 -1945 cf. Pierlot, 70-75) , although he noted afterward: "The ministers still hold that the Allies are certain to be victorious;
the King does not share this optimism" (Rapport, Annexe 38 1932-1939 2e serie (1936-1939) , (Paris, various dates) -hereafter cited as 440, [541] [542] and II, 36; and, respectively, ibid., I, [608] [609] and II, [34] [35] it, that is, in disguise: undisguised, it would have been anathema to some Belgians with long memories and moreover incompatible with continued membership in the League of Nations, to which the Socialists in particular were committed. The King's policy found its chief executor in Spaak. Indeed, Leopold proposed it as the simple answer to a recent call by Spaak for "a foreign policy thoroughly and exclusively Belgian."77 Spaak himself made it his own retroactively when he presented it to the Chamber the following October 28 as a policy not of "neutrality," but of "independence,"78 for the previous September he had induced his party to declare against "a return to neutrality" and for 86. See DDB IV, Nos. 216, 218, 219; FRUS, 1937 I, 64-65. 87. Annales, Chambre. Session ordinaire de 1936-1937, 1285-1286 . Actually the Franco-British declaration also registered the Belgian government's "renewed reassurances of the fidelity of Belgium" to her obligations under the League Covenant, but Spaak now renewed his government's assurances of Belgium's infidelity to Article 16 ("in no case can the right of passage be imposed on Belgium": ibid., [1286] [1287] Yet not all Belgians blinded themselves to the evidence that their neutrality was serving Germany's aggression, from which only Germany's own guarantee [1936] [1937] [1285] [1286] 1939-1940, 194-195, 940 (on Belgium's mounting "anxiety") and Annales, Chambre. Session ordinaire de 1944-1945, 597. Pierlot's rejoinder at Limoges -"We are not here to discuss the policy of neutrality till the invasion. We did not all agree in this matter. We followed the policy approved by the chambers . . ." (Contribution, 163) -was an extreme oversimplification. In 1941
Spaak followed it up in London with a "grey book" in defense of the "policy of inde- 1945 -1 October 1946 , 42 vols. [Nuremberg, 1947 -1959 , X, 519, 522-this source hereafter referred to as IMT). And on the balance, the indications are that Germany was vulnerable to an Allied offensive through Belgium even between the Polish and the Scandinavian campaigns: compare IMT XV, 381-382, with ibid. X, 520-521. But this much is patent: that only because "Belgium shielded the Ruhr" (Christopher Thorne, The Approach of War, 1938 -1939 [London, 1967 , 5) was Hitler able to operate on other fronts (see DGFP, Ser. D, I, 35; II, 475-476, 686-687, 727-730; VII, 203-204, 478; also Ser. C, V, 1094 also Ser. C, V, -1095 Ser. D., II, 219-220, 737-738, 977, 979-980; V, 641-642, 647, 653, 656-657, 657-658, 658-659; VI, 713-714, 799-800, 956; etc. -and DDB V, 121, 185) . FRUS, 1937 I, 77-80, 84, 89-92, 96-98, 676-677; 1938 I, 583; 1939 I, 444-445 (cf. DDB V, 372) . Of the many relevant memoirs, see especially Joseph Paul-Boncour, Entre deux guerres. Souvenirs sur la IIIe Republique, III: Sur les chemins de la dc'faite 1935 (Paris, 1946 and Reynaud, France I, 394-401; Coeur, 210- For over a year now the government has been considering how to strengthen Belgium militarily. There have been several compelling reasons for its concern:
(a) Germany's rearmament, following upon the total remilitarization of Italy and Russia, has prompted most other states . . . to take exceptional precautionary measures;
(b) the methods of warfare have undergone such vast changes due to technical 133. See France II, 256, and IX, 2760ff.; Contribution, 97; DDB V, Nos. 164, 173, 179, 194, 230, 233. Cf. Churchill, Storm, 472-473, and Finest, 34. 1939 , 940 (16 April 1940 .
136. This statement -the very "definition of our policy" for Belgian officials until Our military policy -like our foreign policy, on which it perforce depends should have as its object, not to prepare for a more or less successful war by means of a coalition, but to keep war off our territory.
The reoccupation of the Rhineland, by vitiating the Locarno agreements in their letter and in their spirit, put us almost back into our international position of before the war.
Because of our geographic situation, we require a military machine capable of dissuading any one of our neighbors from utilizing our territory for an attack on another state. In discharging this mission, Belgium makes an outstanding contribution to peace in western Europe and thereby acquires a right to the respect and, if need be, the aid of the states concerned with peace there.
On this much I believe Belgian opinion to be unanimous. But our commitments should extend no farther. Any one-sided policy would weaken our position abroad and would, rightly or wrongly, arouse dissension at home. An alliance, even a purely defensive one, does not meet our needs; for, however promptly an ally's help might come to us, it would come only after the invader's blow, which would be staggering. We would in any case have to meet this blow alone. . .
That is why we must, as the Foreign Minister recently said, pursue a policy "thoroughly and exclusively Belgian." Its resolute aim must be to keep us out of the conflicts of our neighbors, as accords with our national ideal. It can be sustained by a reasonable financial and military effort. And it will win the support of the Belgians, motivated as they all are by an intense and profound desire for peace.
May those who doubt whether such a foreign policy be possible . . . remember how our scrupulous observance of neutrality weighed decisively in our favor . . . throughout the war and during the settlement that followed. Our moral position would have been incomparably weaker at home, and the world would not have shown us the sympathy it did, had the invader been able to point to an alliance between ourselves and one of his opponents.
The sole aim of our military system must, then, be -I repeat -to preserve us from war, from whatever side war may come; and it is important that the public should receive a categorical assurance to this effect. . .13T
and so forth.
137. DDB IV, 323-328; Contribution, 42-43.
purpose of the proposed new policy was to preserve Belgium from war. And yet when he argued the moral benefit that Belgium derived after 1914 from having scrupulously observed her neutrality before it was violated, he did so quite as if he took for granted that the proposed reversion to neutrality would fail in its single purpose: that history would repeat itself. But note also the discrepancy between Leopold's clear prevision of the initial impact of a mechanized blitzkrieg on Belgium and his chimerical proposal that Belgium fabricate unaided a defensive system capable of dissuading the Germans from utilizing her virtually indefensible territory. To be sure, he maintained that his neutrality policy was only a pis aller for collective security, which the remilitarization of the Rhineland had shown to be "almost" unenforceable; but then that neutrality policy, after having been justified on the ground that collective security was "almost" unenforceable, served
Belgium as justification for obstructing the enforcement of collective security during the Czechoslovakian crisis. In Leopold's original phrasing, it was "almost impossible... to apply the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations against. . . violations of conventions, even conventions freely subscribed"; Belgium's reversion to neutrality, justified in these terms, thereupon served to justify Belgium in violating her own freely subscribed commitment to those very provisions. Again, Leopold's premise was that "even conventions freely subscribed" by Germany were worthless, but his conclusion was a policy of neutrality geared to Germany's guarantee. The point of that policy, as he explained at its inception, was to discourage Germany from aggression against Belgium, and yet it was upheld to the last despite Germany's blatant undiscouragement. It was put across on the consideration that There remains a last line taken by retrospective apologists for the King's policy, a line of excuse rather than of justification for it: that its promulga- he would just decline the fearful prospect. So far, this sounds like gross wishful thinking.142 But in fact the reverse was true, for Leopold did allow that the attack was a prospect after all, and this in terms which, taken together, betrayed a secret persuasion that the prospective attack was inevitable, that it would be irresistible, and that Belgium would succumb to it.
That persuasion shows through the very shallowness of his counteraffirmation of January 1940 to the American ambassador in Brussels: "There is no danger but immediate danger."143 That same persuasion sounds through the starkness with which, in this same period, he forecast to a former minister what he could not himself believe: "I cannot believe that Belgium will be attacked. ... We are loyally fulfilling the duties of our neutrality [and] . . . of our [national] defense. If the catastrophe comes, our country will be entirely destroyed, streams of blood will flow, but we will do our duty actively to the last. Our country's fate will be terrible, but never will it be possible to say that we failed in our duty."144 Leopold voiced that inner persuasion most clearly, however, in that, even as he declined the fearful prospect, he continually pointed back to the precedent of 1914-and ahead to Germany's magnified power of aggression. This he did already in that maiden statement of his on Belgian neutrality, which I quoted at length -and one word of which I intentionally misrendered as syntax required. Actually Leopold did not say: "however promptly an ally's help might come to us, it would come only after the invader's blow, which would be staggering." He said: "which will be staggering."1145 The King's chief wartime minister caught none of this foreboding undertone: "Without speaking of certitude," Pierlot affirmed, "the King was persuaded that the policy of armed neutrality would remove war from our country."1146 The American ambassador half overheard the undertone: "Belgium was due for it," he recollected, "if a German attack was to occur in the Western theater, and Spaak for one believed that such an offensive would take place before the summer was over. The King had the same realistic grasp 142. Thus Clive, 7: "The King's policy ... was inspired by the hope, which developed into an obsession, that in this way alone would he be able to save Belgium from the horrors of war. This obsession made him blind to other considerations." Belgium's neutrality was likewise Leopold's ground for refusing to pass into 147. Cudahy, Case, 4, concerning 17 January 1940 -but cf. Cudahy to the Secretary of State, 18 May 1940 , in FRUS, 1940 : "The King sent for me this morning and asked me to tell the President that he considered the invasion of Belgium only a matter of time." The German ambassador also half overheard the undertone through the medium of "a representative of the Court, who is very close to the King" and who, during the January crisis, "emphatically told me . . . that the king . . . was firmly resolved to pursue to the end -even to the bitter end -this policy of neutrality, which he himself had initiated": DGFP, Ser. D, VIII, 675. See also Liddell Hart, II, 206, on Leopold's "deep distrust of Hitler, and anxiety about his aggressive aims" as of April 1938, and Joseph E. Davies, in The Belgian Campaign and the Surrender of the Belgian Army. May 10-28, 1940 (Belgian American Educational Foundation, New York, 1940 , 77, on 14 January 1940: "He was harassed and worried. Nevertheless, he was objectively realistic in his appraisal of the situation, and firm in his determination to follow out his policy to the end. He was hoping desperately against hope that all the belligerents would respect the promises which they had given to Belgium." Leopold's most cogent explanation for his surrender was a nonexplanation.
He invoked an inscrutable inner imperative, which was a sentimental impera- 1944 -1945 , 552-553 (De Vleeschauwer, 24 July 1945 , and quoted in Rapport, note comphgmentaire, 33. 167. Joseph E. Davies, in The Belgian Campaign, 77, citing "a personal letter from [Leopold] dated three days before the German attack" (Albert's pledge was his constitutional oath). The guarantees accorded to Belgium in 1937 were non-reciprocal: Belgium was entitled to renounce her neutrality toward any of her guarantors at any time, though this of course at the cost of the corresponding guaranteess. In fact, taken literally, the German guarantee was contingent only on Belgium's not cooperating in any military action directed against Germany, while the Franco-British guarantee was unconditional. In practice, then, "the King's policy of neutrality at any price" (Clive, 7) was the very reverse of a policy of "independence" -or of "free hands" as in Leopold to Spaak, 27 October 1936 (Van Overstraeten, 239 Actually the veneration was more marked than the inspiration until Leopold's accession. Earlier he did marry at the same age as his father before him -and manage to have two boys and a girl like his father before him.
He did climb mountains too. And he took his cues from his father in public in his desire to usurp his father's place at his mother's side. Leopold's Oedipal guilt would have been intensified, eighteen months after his accession, by his wife's accidental death at his hands, for this left the queen mother alone as queen beside him. Thenceforth especially would he have striven to relive 169. Pierre Goemaere, Une Journee avec le Roi des Belges (Brussels, 1946), 14-15 (Goemaere's ellipsis in the first two cases); also ibid., 6, on Leopold's always pausing "just the way King Albert did" before replying in conversation.
170. Quoted in Le Soir, 23 February 1934, 3. Cammaerts, Prisoner, 225, also noted this change, if less emphatically: "The Prince's affection for his father was akin to heroworship. His most ardent wish was to follow in the hero's footsteps. This attitude is maintained and strengthened after the accession. It shows itself in every word, in every action. It pervades everything."
171. Annales, Senat. Session ordinaire de 1933-1934, 555 (literally: "so clairvoyantly"). Leopold's private secretary bore him out in retrospect: "Called upon in February 1934 to assume the constitutional charge of Chief of the Belgian State, King Leopold III has a single preoccupation: to seek inspiration in all circumstances from the precepts of government that King Albert taught him" (LUon Capelle, Au Service du Roi 1934 [Brussels, 1949 , 13).
172. Which way he was seeking it can be read out of the far-fetched connection he drew in a speech of 12 May 1935 between the paternal precedent and the unprecedented depression: "In a war imposed upon us, he liberated our country. His example should guide us in the economic battle we are waging today" (Contribution, 33). piatory outcome: as the tragic finale to his royal mother-romance. At bottom, moreover, that guilty project of his, the destruction of Belgium, would also have been his death wish against his father, the personification of Belgium.
And it would have subserved his incestuous design on his mother, for in accomplishing it he brought the guilt-ridden solitude his mother shared with him to a new extreme. Like Oedipus' own guilty project, Leopold's would even have taken the form of a prophetic vision of a fate he was to accomplish through his very efforts at eluding it -only the project that was uncensored for Oedipus in the oracle's prophecy would have been concealed from Leopold behind his premonition of the punitive disaster to be visited upon his realm. On this Theban construction, Leopold's forced abdication itself was in the books.
So much for Leopold as Oedipus. Or, rather, too much, for this construction just doesn't hold up. The trouble with it is that Leopold as neutralist was precisely not following the path Albert had so clearsightedly traced. For Leopold's policy of neutrality countermanded Albert's eager repudiation of Belgium's neutrality,173 and in putting that policy across Leopold was the reverse of the correct constitutional monarch that Albert had been.174 This is not to deny Leopold's Oedipus complex: there is no denying anyone's Oedipus complex, let alone Leopold's. It is, though, to deny that his guilty project alias "the 
Even Cammaerts owned that Albert would at all odds have managed to avoid
Leopold's misunderstanding with his ministers (ibid., 232ff.). Notorious among Leopold's lesser neutralist deviations from the paternal precedent was his failure to appear before parliament following the invasion. "To be sure, the King can try to justify his omission by pointing out that King Albert had some days but he only some hours at his disposal. In fact, though, what is at issue here is not time, but the King's unwillingness to appear before parliament despite the request addressed to him" (Prime Minister Achille Van Acker on 20 July 1945: Annales, Chambre. Session ordinaire de 1944-1945, 532) . Moreover, it is hard to imagine that Albert would have surrendered when Leopold did (cf. Dennis Wheatley, The Black Baroness [London, 1940] , 275: "He knows perfectly well that he ought to fight on, and the memory of his father seems to haunt him"). His car was in perfect order that morning; its speed was low; the sun was out; the road was clear. Just short of Kiissnacht he glanced an instant too long at a road map that Astrid was holding for him. Another instant and the right wheels of his roadster had passed through a break in the stone curb bordering the road. Thereafter the curb blocked the car from regaining the road even as the slope of the bank impelled it toward the lake. A first, huge jolt along its rough course hurled Astrid against that deadly tree.176 Leopold himself was ejected some moments later by a collision with a second tree, whereupon the vehicle swerved into the lake, with the chauffeur still lodged in the rumble seat. While the chauffeur dislodged himself, the King rushed to the Queen.'77 He found her in a coma, her face and clothing bloody. The Kiissnacht police arrived with a doctor in a matter of minutes, but by then Astrid was dead in Leopold's arms. As for Leopold, he was in a state of shock'78 such that he was unable to talk. His identity having been established,'79 he was taken in hand by the doctor while Brussels was notified. His Prime Minister and his private secretary flew in at once to escort him home along with Astrid's body. By all accounts, his suffering was "dreadful to behold."''80 The worst of it was that before he could even begin to assimilate this private tragedy it was already a public event; indeed, his assimilating it was 176. Presumably the car sideswiped the deadly tree as the left wheels suddenly jumped the curb in their turn (Bezirksamt, No. 3) . The one close eyewitness testified concerning the decisive moment: "The driver must have then stepped on the gas, for the left rear wheel began spinning. The car was then jolted, struck against the tree that was on the other side of the curb, and rode down the slope. Before the driver stepped on the gas, the lady opened the door; presumably she meant to jump out. The lady was then thrown onto the grass . . ." (ibid., No. 8).
177. After some quick words with a couple in a second Belgian car, which then sped to Kiissnacht (ibid.). -188. Ibid., 6 September 1935 , 3. 189. Ibid., 8 September 1935 , 2. 190. Ibid., 9 September 1935 . About this time Astrid's death car was sunk in the deepest waters of Lake Lucerne "at the King's special request" (Bezirksamt, No. 35). 191. Clive, 7. 192. Cudahy, Case, 5. 193 . Likewise Clive, 7: "I have never seen him laugh. I doubt if he has ever laughed since the tragic death of his consort . . ."
194. Cammaerts, Prisoner, 44-45 (last ellipsis Cammaerts').
ready, he now re-enacted it nationally and internationally. In the back of his mind, his realm stood for his sometime Queen. The K.Ussnacht catastrophe would be repeated when Belgium would be "hurled all at once into a war of unheard-of violence." He was himself to drive Belgium to that catastrophe by taking over irregularly from his responsible ministers, who yet went along with him -just like his chauffeur before them. He was to drive Belgium that way incognito: in the name of Paul Henri Spaak.195 And he was to draw the same ignominy upon himself after the new mortal catastrophe as after the old. Here, then, was the "mission" he nominally assigned to Belgium on October 14, 1936, but actually assigned to himself, as he expressed it at Wynendael after the fact. This was the inside story of his insisting that the catastrophe would not, could not, must not come to Belgium -while halfconsciously expecting it and unconsciously contriving it. Now at last, in this perspective, the King's policy-his guilty project is illuminated in its every hitherto perplexing particular.
Reconsider in this perspective his maiden statement on neutrality, delivered on October 14, 1936. His prevision of the sudden, unprecedented, "staggering" mechanical violence of a blitzkrieg went back to that first, fatal jolt at Kiissnacht, which, from his vantage, befell the car all at once in a dizzying swirl.
His very word for the prospective impact of aggression'96 was the one he had presumably used for that first jolt of the death car in the account of the accident: the word "choc"'197-which of course also recalled his nervous shock that ensued. Kiissnacht was furthermore his reason why, however promptly help might come to Belgium, it would perforce come too late: why "we would in any case have to meet this choc alone" -and why he subsequently saw to it that this was the case. Now we can grasp the personal sense of Leopold's characteristic neutralist utterances in those years of waiting that followed: "There is no danger but immediate danger"; a peaceable nation in the Europe of 1938 is like "a motorist who is calmly driving along a road, but is exposed to the possibility of an accident produced out of a byroad";198 "if the catastrophe comes, . . . streams of blood will flow"; and this one dating from the aftermath of Munich: 196. Rendered "blow" above, and in n.145 (where "invasion" renders "irruption").
197. Van Overstraeten, 172 ("un premier choc"). 198. DGFP, Ser. D, II, No. 310, 511 (newly translated to preserve the indefiniteness of the original: "Autofahrer, der ruhig seine Strasse verfolge, aber der M6glichkeit ausgesetzt sei, dass von Seitenstrasse her ein Unfall herbeigefiihrt werde") -an indirect quotation by the German minister in Belgium (23 July 1938) of words spoken in "deep concern" (p. 510) and "pessimism" (p. 511) over the mounting Sudeten crisis: nominally the motorist was Germany, the minister having just represented German policy as peaceable.
"we are still at the mercy of an accident."199 Now it will be obvious why Leopold made such a show of seemingly doing everything possible to avert the impending disaster: he was thereby arguing his blamelessness for Kiissnacht. Thence his typical remark: "Our country's fate will be terrible, but never will it be possible to say that we failed in our duty." All told, he was out for ostensible blamelessness in the face of calumny. As he told the American ambassador two days after surrendering his army: "He knew that his action would be misunderstood and . . . that he would be overwhelmed by opprobrium.... It was a hard role to accept, yet he did so without hesitation. .".200
Reconsider now Leopold's resigned assurance, following the German breakthrough, that his army would be driven to the sea, that there was no maneuvering out of this fatality: he was then figuratively back in the driver's seat of that Kiissnacht car impelled along its course toward the water after that first, deadly jolt without his being able to control it beyond slight turns this way or that, much less steer it to safety across that impassable curb -which policy of neutrality -and the reopening followed the surrender by exactly the three years, seven months, and thirteen-and-a-half days by which the surrender had followed the launching.216 It was as true of his forced abdication 211. Quoted in Contribution, 319 (Pierlot on Wynendael); cf. above (his decision "was dictated to him by his conscience" and "my duty commands me").
212. Goemaere, passim; cf. n.193, and Cammaerts, Keystone, 356 ("one of his rare smiles").
213. The constitutional conflict was not quite yet engaged at Wynendael, where Pierlot merely warned him of this "catastrophe in the offing" (Contribution, 141). Thus Spaak to Leopold, 26 May 1940: "it is still not too late. I therefore implore the King ." (ibid., 144).
214. Leopold's rejoinder took the form of a note that was "absolutely impersonal. Can it even be called a reply? It is rather a refusal to reply-une fin de non-recevoir" (Pierlot, 95). 215. To Roger Keyes, who quit him at 10:00 P.M. on 24 May 1940, he declared that England would win after going "through a hell for a time" (quoted in Recuedi, 58, and Wullus-Rudiger, 255, 288; see also ibid., 288-289); an hour later he accepted the unconditional surrender, set for the following 4:00 A.M.
216. True, he had received the government's message of 21 November 1943 only six days before penning his rejoinder-but that message required no answer, and he had left a less conciliatory one of October 1942 (Contribution, 282) unanswered. A sudden inspiration, the rejoinder was ten days old before he thought of transmitting it to London (Pierlot, 95-where, however, it is misdated). By then his "political testament" was underway.
as previously of the German invasion that -as a journalist recently remarked 224. Quoted by Van Overstraeten, 172. In both cases the death wound was indeed a big hole in the right occiput.
225. Le Soir, 19 February 1934 , 4. 226. Paul Hymans, Memoires, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1958 I have argued that Kiissnacht was in fact behind the King's policy of [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] and that this policy was decisive for the course of Belgian historyindeed, that it was integral to the prehistory of Hitler's war. Here, then, is a clear-cut, solid example of how, even in history, great effects can follow from small causes: of how la grande histoire can follow from la petite histoire. And yet our professional histories are generally written as if all big events followed from other big events. Some historians, it is true, object to this view in respect to one specific big event after another; only they themselves ignore their own objections in the last resort. The going conception of how history works allows that individuals may indeed act out of private motives to public effect; the catch is the corollary that their historical efficacy comes of their doing the work of their times. The classic statement of this conception is Hegel's. For Hegel, la grande histoire ran a logical course, with historic individuals serving its purposes more or less unwittingly while also serving their own purposes on the level of la petite histoire. Leopold, however, was not reacting to the general European situation at the same time as he was abreacting Kiissnacht; he was abreacting Kiissnacht within the context of European politics, which is quite another matter. In his own ever so apt words: "As against the most solid logical or political considerations, there are reasons of sentiment that cannot be got around."229 Again, we may consider that little events are so 228. Cammaerts, Prisoner, 226. 229. In a like vein, Belgium's number two neutralist of [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] , Spaak, appears to have been primarily motivated toward the King himself from the first-and right down many intermediate links between big events and that they can therefore be ignored for all practical purposes -like, say, the subtle play of muscle and nerve between a blow received and the pain felt in consequence; Kiissnacht, however, was caused by no big event. Or again, we may imagine that la grande histoire is all too big to be bothered by Belgium's neutrality, that its causal logic holds only for superevents the size of mass wars or great revolutions. But then we get bogged down in the problem of how superhistory relates to mere history. In any case, an argument can be made that sage scientific procedure -and here I am drawing Occam's razor-calls for excluding the problematical explanation in favor of the single, simple, sufficient explanation.
If the King's policy, and hence Belgium's neutrality of 1936-1940, followed from Leopold's accident at Kiissnacht, that neutrality did not follow from the failure of Locarno or the remilitarization of the Rhineland or the contest between Fleming and Walloon, let alone from the world spirit's dialectical self-development. But observe: if we apply Occam's razor at this (or any) juncture of la grande histoire, we cut the whole thread of it, which then falls away at both sides: ever since, and ever after.230
So, having done with the higher explanations for Belgium's neutrality of 1936-1940, I return to what I contend is the explanation -to la petite histoire de Leopold -for my remaining conclusions. And these go farther in the same direction as my conclusion against la grande histoire, however slightly and tentatively. For the notion that big events are causally related among themselves to the exclusion of little events -even if it now pervades historical thinking -is bound to succumb to its very inanity in due course. The historian's job for the future begins, therefore, with the exacting analysis of just such specific cases of historical determination as the one here at issue.
The way to that future passes through Freud. For Freud, adult thought and conduct came of infantile motives transferred to actual situations -except, that is, in traumatic neuroses, which he accordingly regarded as anomalous through his offer to resign at Wynendael (which Pierlot overruled: King's notes in Rapport, Annexe 38) and, during his six-year campaign for Leopold's abdication, his talk of his disappointed "affection" for Leopold (Annales, Chambre. Session ordinaire de 1944 de -1945 de , 558: 24 July 1945 .
230. If there are sufficient causes in human relations, they include par excellence the initiatives of some men with which other men willy-nilly comply. The sufficient cause for Belgium's policy of neutrality 1936-1940 was Leopold's sustained initiative in its behalf forasmuch as his compatriots did in fact cooperate. To say that the national and international circumstances within which he took and sustained that initiative were propitious, as I do say, is not to qualify the sufficiency of the cause. And psychologically Kiissnacht was sufficient cause for Leopold's initiative-given his emotional constitution, to be sure. But even if Kiissnacht was only a necessary cause of Leopold's initiative, and Leopold's initiatve only a necessary cause of Belgium's neutrality 1936 Belgium's neutrality -1940 , the working distinction between la grande histoire and la petite histoire falls-and history is forever "at the mercy of an accident." conduct much less guilty than Leopold's: reversal of roles, expiation, and undoing. But this classification is disappointingly uninstructive as to the single, final sense of disguised repetition with modification.
If disguised repetition with modification is the normal way of shock absorption, it is no more effective than the neurotic way: thus Leopold is still accident-prone. Whether a shock is abreacted neurotically or nonneurotically would seem to depend on its intensity in respect to the emotional constitution that has undergone it. Kiissnacht was a severe enough shock for neurotic aftereffects, but Leopold was preconditioned by Albert's grisly death -and, rumor has it, by a pregnant girl friend's suicide in his youth. However, my other cases involved preconditioning too -and shocks so slight by comparison that the question arises whether even the slightest shock might not set off the abreactive mechanism of disguised repetition with modification.
And how, finally, did Leopold's imitation of his father accord with this mechanism of disguised repetition with modification? Leopold consciously imitated his father at the same time as he unconsciously re-enacted Kiissnacht, except when he could not do both; then the re-enactment prevailed. It would seem that these two tendencies of repetition and imitation together account for his entire performance as neutralist, repetition having been the underlying, imperative one of the two. But the use of two different terms here is misleading. Imitation is after all a variant of repetition: Leopold undisguisedly repeated an experience of his father's as best he could while disguisedly repeating an experience of his own. The undisguised repetition served to screen the disguised repetition -yet it was no mere screening device, as it was continuous with his prior imitation of his father. It tended primarily to help him assimilate the experience of his own which he was repeating for that purpose. That is, the better to assimilate his Kiissnacht experience, he relived it as far as possible in an otherwise normal way of living. For to relive others' experiences is the easy, ordinary way with us, perhaps the only way so long as we can control the effect events have on us. When, however, events affect us beyond our control so that an experience all our own befalls us, we relive it uneasily, extraordinarily, in a futile attempt to live it down.
Brandeis University
This content downloaded from 147.9.69.210 on Wed, 06 Apr 2016 01:31:42 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
